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Abstract
This paper trials new experimental methods for the analysis of natural language rea-
soning and the (re)development of critical ordinary language philosophy in thewake of
J.L. Austin. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments are strongly shaped by
default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences. Austin suggested that
contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philosoph-
ical paradoxes and problems, and that these can be resolved by exposing those verbal
fallacies. This paper builds on recent efforts to empirically document inappropriate
stereotypical inferences that may drive philosophical arguments. We demonstrate that
previously employed questionnaire-based output measures do not suffice to exclude
relevant confounds.We then report an experiment that combines reading timemeasure-
ments with plausibility ratings. The study seeks to provide evidence of inappropriate
stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs that have been suggested to lie at the
root of the influential ‘argument from illusion’. Our findings support a diagnostic
reconstruction of this argument. They provide the missing component for proof of
concept for an experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy
that is in line with the ambitions of current ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy.
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1 Introduction
Natural language reasoning is shaped by inferences that have received relatively lit-
tle attention in the philosophical literature: Arguments couched in natural language
are strongly shaped by automatic inferences that continuously occur in language
comprehension and production. Default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypi-
cal inferences (Levinson 2000), enrich our spontaneous understanding of verbal case
descriptions and premises of arguments. These defeasible default inferences shape
philosophical thought experiments (Saint-Germier 2019) and arguments couched in
natural language (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019a). J. L. Austin (1962) mooted the idea
that they sometimes do so not for better but for worse. He suggested that philosophers
sometimes make defeasible stereotypical inferences even in contexts that defeat them;
that such contextually inappropriate inferences are particularly prone to occur when
we give special uses to words that have related but distinct uses in ordinary discourse;
and that such fallacies are at the root of some influential philosophical paradoxes and
problems. The approach of ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy seeks to resolve
pertinent problems by exposing fallacies in the underlying reasoning. Its first paradigm
(worked model) was Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia (1962), which sought to contribute
to ‘dissolving’ what is today known as ‘the problem of perception’ (Crane and French
2015; Smith 2002) by exposing fallacies in the underlying ‘argument from illusion’.
The present paper will use this paradigm to explain the approach (Sect. 1.1), and
why it needs empirical vindication (Sect. 1.2). The bulk of the paperwill then argue that
such vindication requires sophisticated experimental methods from psycholinguistics
and will employ reading-time measurements with eye tracking for the purpose. The
philosophical upshot will be the vindication of a diagnostic reconstruction of the argu-
ment from illusion that exposes contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences at
its root. Methodologically, the paper will show how eye tracking can be employed for
the new, philosophical, purpose of argument analysis. At the metaphilosophical level,
the paper will thus afford proof of concept for critical ordinary language philosophy
as a partially experimental enterprise.
1.1 The target argument
The argument from illusion is the historically most influential argument against naïve
realism in the philosophy of perception (Robinson 1994). The argument proceeds
in two main steps: Its ‘base step’ argues that in particular cases of non-veridical
perception (‘illusion’),where something appears F but actually has the different colour,
size, or shape G, subjects are (directly) aware of sense-data, rather than physical
objects; a ‘spreading step’ extends this conclusion to all cases of perception (Snowdon
1992). Along with parallel arguments (e.g., ‘from hallucination’), the argument thus
appears to challenge our common-sense conception of perception, according to which
our senses typically provide us with unmediated awareness of physical objects. This
challenge gives rise to the philosophical ‘problem of perception’ (Crane and French
2015; Smith 2002).
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Austin (1962) engaged with early twentieth century proponents of the argument
(incl. Ayer 1940, pp. 3–11; Broad 1923, p. 240; Price 1932, pp. 27–30; Russell 1912,
pp. 1–3). These thinkers leaped from initial case descriptions to negative conclusions,
e.g.:
(1) When a subject looks at a round coin sideways, the coin appears elliptical to her.
(2) When a subject looks at a round coin sideways, she is not (directly) aware of the
round coin.
They then inferred that subjects are, instead, aware of an ‘elliptical sense-datum’, from
an uncontroversial response to (2):
(3) When a subject looks at a round coin sideways, she is (directly) aware of some-
thing.
(4) By (2) and (3), the subject is then (directly) aware of something other than the
round coin (namely, a ‘sense-datum’).
Later, we will consider the currently canonical form of the base step and see that it,
too, ultimately relies on the spontaneous inference from the initial case description (1)
to the negative conclusion (2) explicitly acknowledged by the early twentieth century
version of the argument.
Austin seems to suggest that this key move involves contextually inappropriate
stereotypical inferences from the appearance verb used in (1)—mainly ‘appear’ (e.g.,
Ayer 1940, p. 3; Fish 2010, pp. 12–13; Robinson 1994, p. 57; Russell 1912, p. 2;
Smith 2002, p. 25) or ‘seem’ (e.g., Ayer 1940, p. 3; Broad 1923, pp. 239–240; Crane
and French 2015, p. 3; Moore 1918/19, pp. 21–23; Russell 1912, p. 2), and only
occasionally ‘look’ (e.g., Ayer 1940, p. 4). Austin (1962, pp. 36–37) suggests that
while ‘look’ is typically used simply to comment on the look of things, ‘appear’
‘would typically be used with reference to certain special circumstances’ affecting
judgment, and ‘seem’ ‘makes an implicit reference to certain [inconclusive] evidence’
supporting judgment. Accordingly, at any rate ‘X appears F [to S]’ and ‘X seems F [to
S]’ are typically used with doxastic implications (S thinks that X is F) (cf. Brogaard
2013, 2014) and have us infer from (1) above that
(C) The viewer thinks that the object viewed is elliptical.
In the context of the argument from illusion, such doxastic inferences would be doubly
inappropriate. First, proponents of the argument explicitly acknowledge that, in the
familiar cases at issue, viewers confidently judge that things actually have some shape,
size, or colour distinct from the one they look under the circumstances (e.g., Ayer
1956, p. 88; Broad 1923, pp. 236–237, 241; cf. Price 1932, p. 27); nobody falls prey
to an ‘illusion’, in these cases. Second, proponents intend to use appearance- and
perception-verbs in a rare ‘phenomenal’ sense that implies nothing about perceivers’
physical environment or their knowledge or beliefs about it (Ayer 1956, p. 90; Jackson
1977, pp. 33–49; cf. Chisholm 1957, pp. 44–48; Maund 1986).1 This sense—and only
1 We provide experimental evidence that a suitably non-factive, non-epistemic, and non-doxastic sense
(where ‘X looks F to S’ etc. imply neither that X is F nor that S knows or thinks it is F) is recognised for
all three appearance verbs not only by (some) philosophers but by ordinary speakers (see Appendix 3). We
will refer to this rare, but established sense as ‘phenomenal’. For this paper’s purposes, it is immaterial how
well the cited philosophical explanations capture—or how much they misconstrue—it.
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this sense—allows them tomake claim (1). But this sense does not license the inference
from (1) to (C).
Austin does not explain how this doxastic inference could contribute to the argu-
ment’s move from (1) to (2). Fischer (2014) proposes to fill the gap by showing how
(C) and uncontroversial background assumptions entail (2): (1) entails that the coin
viewed is round. Together with (C), this entails that the viewer has awrong belief about
the coin, and does not know that it is round, or that there is a round coin. Together with
standard definitions of ‘to be aware of’ (‘to have cognizance, know, have knowledge as
obtained by observation or information’, Oxford English Dictionary), this entails that
the viewer is not aware of the round coin. Standard definitions of ‘direct awareness’
do not cancel epistemic implications but rather impose the stricter requirement that
the relevant knowledge be acquired without conscious inference. Hence the ignorant
viewer is not ‘directly aware’ of the round coin, either. If this a priori reconstruction of
the move from (1) to (2) is correct, the argument from illusion proceeds from a contex-
tually inappropriate inference from the appearance verb in its initial premise2—so that
the argument does not get off the ground and the philosophical problem of perception
fails to arise, if parallel arguments similarly fail.
1.2 Need for empirical vindication
As developed byAustin, critical ordinary language philosophy seeks to expose ‘seduc-
tive (mainly verbal) fallacies’ as ‘concealed motives’ for formulating philosophical
paradoxes and problems that can be ‘dissolved’ through such exposure (Austin 1962,
p. 5).3 That the inferences are ‘concealed’ means that thinkers are not conscious
of making them and presupposing their conclusions, in the relevant arguments.4 Psy-
cholinguistic research has confirmed the occurrence of pertinent inferences: automatic
inferences fromwords that continually occur beyond conscious awareness in language
comprehension and production (see below, Sect. 2.1), which are crucially involved in
verbal reasoning. This opens the intriguing possibility that philosophers might inad-
vertently but recurrently rely on fallacious automatic inferences they would explicitly
reject.
Any hypothesis that such inferences drive a philosophical argument requires empir-
ical vindication. The need for empirical vindication arises from the facts that the
hypothesized inferences are, first, ‘concealed’ and, second, fallacious. First, an a pri-
ori reconstruction of verbal reasoning (like the one above) can only specify one of
several inference chains that could have led thinkers from a premise (like 1) to a con-
clusion it does not entail (like 2). Thinkers have no privileged access to automatic
inferences. Where thinkers’ relevant inferences (e.g., from 1 to C) are automatic,
thinkers’ self-reports or acceptance of a proposed a priori reconstruction therefore
2 Since proponents of the argument intend to use perception-verbs, too, in a phenomenal sense, the argument
also involves undue reliance on the ordinary epistemic sense of ‘to be aware of’. This vitiates those rare
versions of the argument that proceed from unfamiliar cases of non-veridical perception.
3 For a variety of different recent contributions to ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy, see Baz (2017),
Fischer et al. (2019), and Hansen (2018), cf. Weinberg (2017).
4 This is the most productive and charitable interpretation, in that it does not take Austin’s project to rest
on the accusation that the targeted philosophers dishonestly ‘conceal’ their motives from others.
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cannot provide a justified answer to the question of which inference chain—of those
many potentially relevant chains—actually led them from premise to conclusion.5
Automatic inferences can, however, be documented experimentally, so we can turn to
experiments for a justified answer.
Second, and independently, principles of charity limit the extent to which read-
ers of philosophical texts may attribute fallacious inferences to authors. Plausible
‘medium-strength’ principles strike a balance between respecting authors’ rationality
and appreciating human fallibility: They allow us to attribute violations of rational or
linguistic norms to competent thinkers and speakers, but only if we have an empirically
supported explanation of when and why competent thinkers commit the fallacies at
issue (Thagard and Nisbett 1983). Austin seeks to expose contextually inappropriate
stereotypical inferences in some influential philosophical arguments. These fallacies
are a case in point: Austin maintains—and psycholinguistic research confirms (see
Sect. 2.1)—that competent speakers’ inferences are highly sensitive to contextual cues.
But philosophers are competent speakers. The prima facie uncharitable hypothesis
that a highly influential philosophical argument relies on a contextually inappropriate
stereotypical inference is hence in need of empirical support.
The required support is twofold: First, we need to develop an empirically supported
explanation of when (under what conditions) and why competent speakers make inap-
propriate stereotypical inferences. The empirical support for this explanation will
include experimental findings that document contextually inappropriate stereotypical
inferences which occur under the conditions C where the explanation predicts them.
Based on textual evidence and a priori logical reconstruction, a diagnostic reconstruc-
tion may suggest a particular argument involves a specific such fallacy. To support this
suggestion, we then need, in addition, to show that the relevant conditions C prevail in
the formulation of the argument, and provide experimental evidence that the specific
inferences posited in it (e.g., doxastic inferences from phenomenal uses of appearance
verbs) are actually made by competent speakers/thinkers.
In a novel extension of the ‘evidential program’ in experimental philosophy (Sytsma
and Livengood 2016, pp. 40–42),6 some recent studies have sought to provide such
empirical foundations for a ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy (Fischer andEngel-
hardt 2017a; Fischer et al. 2019). They developed a psycholinguistic explanation that
lets us understand when and why competent speakers (like philosophers) cannot help
making contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from words with distinct,
but related senses (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019a, b). They used advanced psycholin-
guistic methods (pupillometry and reading time measurements with eye tracking) to
support this explanation and document contextually inappropriate stereotypical infer-
ences predicted by it. However, while they suggested that similar inferences could
occur in philosophical arguments, so far only two questionnaire-based studies (Fis-
5 Acceptance of such a reconstruction can amount to adoption of a new, more fully spelled out argument,
but cannot establish that a particular automatic inference was involved in the original argument.
6 To date, evidential experimental philosophy focused on assessing the evidentiary value of intuitive judg-
ments about verbally described cases, mainly in order to evaluate thought experiments employing the
‘method of cases’ (Machery 2017). Some proponents of the research program have advocated its extension
to the assessment of premises (Nado 2016) and inferences (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019a) in philosophical
arguments beyond thought experiments.
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cher and Engelhardt 2016; Fischer et al. 2019) attempted to provide evidence of the
specific inferences that had been hypothesised to occur in an influential philosophical
argument.
1.3 Aim and agenda
The present paper re-examines the hypothesis that competent language users make
doxastic inferences from phenomenal uses of appearance verbs—like the inference
from (1) to (C) above—which are cancelled by the context but influence further judg-
ment and reasoning anyway. We report an adversarial collaboration that first exposes
a gap in the extant empirical argument and then closes the gap. We will argue that
extant questionnaire-based studies are potentially subject to a confound. To exclude
pertinent confounds, we suggest studying automatic inferences by combining different
questionnaire-based outcome (‘offline’) measures with each other and with process
(‘online’) measures that can tap into cognitive processes as they unfold. The main
study will show how online eye-tracking methods from psycholinguistics, which are
commonly used to examine general hypotheses about language processing, can be
adapted to study how people reason with or about specific lexical items of philosoph-
ical interest.
This is the first study to use this methodology to document automatic comprehen-
sion inferences that drive philosophical arguments. The paper will thus present new
tools for the analysis of natural language reasoning in philosophy, in line with ongoing
efforts to add new empirical methods and fresh philosophical aims to the repertoire
of experimental philosophy (review: Fischer and Curtis 2019). Their application will
provide the first compelling evidence of contextually inappropriate stereotypical infer-
ences that drive an influential philosophical argument. We thus seek to provide what
is still missing for successful proof of concept for experimental implementation of
ordinary language philosophy’s critical project.
Section 2 will explain the notion of ‘stereotypical inference’, set out conditions
under which contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences occur, and summarise
previous experimental work that sought to document inappropriate stereotypical infer-
ences from appearance verbs. Section 3 will develop an alternative explanation of the
previous experimental findings and will report three new experiments that provide
initial support for this alternative explanation. To adjudicate between these two expla-
nations, Sect. 4 will report an eye tracking study and examine correlations between
different offline measures. Section 5 will discuss the intended philosophical applica-
tion of the findings: how they help us expose pernicious inferences in the argument
from illusion.
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2 Inappropriate stereotypical inferences?
2.1 Stereotypical inferences
Stereotypes are implicit knowledge structures in semantic memory that are built up
from observation of co-occurrence frequencies in the physical and discourse envi-
ronment (In the supermarket, most tomatoes are red and round) (McRae and Jones
2013). They may be associated with specific words and are also known as ‘prototypes’
and ‘situation schemas’ when associated with (object-) nouns and verbs, respectively.
When we hear words, the most stereotypical features come to mind first and are eas-
iest to process; these features are diagnostic or predictive of the relevant categories
(Hampton 2006). Event nouns (Hare et al. 2009) and verbs (Ferretti et al. 2001) are
associated with complex situation schemas which include typical features of events
or actions (instruments used, etc.), agents, and ‘patients’ acted on. Priming studies
have shown that single words (‘tomato’) activate stereotypical features (red) rapidly
(within 250 ms) (review: Engelhardt and Ferreira 2016). In sentence comprehension,
feature activation depends upon thematic fit: Sentence fragments that leave blank the
agent- and the patient-role, respectively, activate typical features of agents and patients,
respectively (‘She was arrested by the ___’ activates cop, not crook) (Ferretti et al.
2001; cf. Kim et al. 2016).
In utterance interpretation, the implicit knowledge encoded by stereotypes is imme-
diately brought to bear to fill in details that remain unstated (e.g., the tomato referred
to will have been red, the secretary female, etc.) (Levinson 2000). Stereotypical asso-
ciations support defeasible spontaneous inferences from words (‘tomato’, ‘secretary’)
to features stereotypically associated with them, as illustrated by common responses
to the following vignette (from Giora 2003, p. 3):
A young man and his father had a severe car accident. The father died, and the
young man was rushed to hospital. The surgeon at the emergency room refused
to operate on him, saying, ‘I can’t. He’s my son.’ – How is this possible?
When first encountering the vignette, many readers have difficulty answering this
question. This difficulty is due to an automatic inference from ‘surgeon’ to the stereo-
typically associated gender, whose conclusion (The surgeon is male) may initially get
presupposed in further reasoning (therefore, the surgeon is the young man’s father),
despite the resulting inconsistency with the context (‘the father died’).
To study such inferences, psycholinguists use a cancellation paradigm: Participants
read sentences where the target expression is followed by a sequel that is inconsistent
with (or ‘cancels’) inferences the participant automatically makes after reading the
target expression. If the hypothesised inference is made, the clash of the conclusion
with the sequel will engender comprehension difficulties requiring cognitive effort.
This effort is picked up by a variety of process measures including pupil dilations
(Sirois and Brisson 2014), longer reading times (Clifton et al. 2007), and signature
electrophysiological responses (‘N400s’) (Kutas and Federmeier 2011). Studies using
priming or the cancellation paradigm have shown that verbs prompt parallel proba-
bilistic inferences to typical features of agents, patients, and instruments (Ferretti et al.
2001; Harmon-Vukic et al. 2009; Welke et al. 2015).
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In addition to schemas associated with individual verbs, we have schemas that
encodemore general or specific knowledge about recurrent situations (restaurant visits,
car inspections, etc.). These are rapidly activated by combinations of verbs and nouns:
Participants read the remainder of the sentence more slowly when subject and verb
are followed by a patient atypical for that agent-action pairing, rather than a typical
patient (‘The mechanic/journalist checked the spelling of his latest report’) (Bicknell
et al. 2010), even in the absence of single-word priming of typical patients (Matsuki
et al. 2011). That is, the words we hear or read activate not only knowledge about
typical features of, say, journalists andmechanics, or of checking-events, but alsomore
specific knowledge, e.g., about what mechanics typically check. Inferences supported
by activation of more specific schemas are made at the earliest possible moment, i.e.,
right after the verb (Bicknell et al. 2010). In incremental utterance interpretation, ever
more specific schemas are thus activated by verbs in conjunction with subject- and
object-nouns, with prepositions and syntactic constructions like verb aspect (Ferretti
et al. 2007), and with simultaneous visual stimuli (Kamide et al. 2003).
In co-operative communication (Grice 1989), such inferences are made by hear-
ers and anticipated by speakers in line with the neo-Gricean ‘I-heuristic’ (Levinson
2000; cf. Garrett and Harnish 2007): Speakers typically skip mention of stereotypical
features but make deviations from stereotypes explicit. In the absence of such explicit
indications to the contrary, hearers assume the situation talked about conforms to the
relevant schemas, deploy the most specific schemas relevant, and fill in detail in line
with this knowledge about situations of the kind at issue. The rapid deployment of
the most specific schemas together with the explicit marking of stereotype-deviations
ensures that stereotypical enrichment is highly context-sensitive and inappropriate
stereotypical inferences hinder comprehension and further reasoning only rarely.
This is good news for language users but prima facie bad news for the critical project
of ordinary language philosophy: It means that in the absence of specific empirical
reasons we have no right to believe that competent speakers like philosophers should
rely on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences in their arguments.
2.2 Contextual impropriety?
Against this backdrop, recent work in experimental philosophy has identified specific
conditions under which competent language users make inappropriate stereotypical
inferences that stubbornly influence further cognition. Under these conditions, lan-
guage users do not merely make contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences,
but are unable to disregard their conclusions even after the problematic inferences have
been made explicit. In this way these stubborn inferences contrast, for instance, with
the problematic inference from ‘surgeon’ in the vignette above, where readers have no
problem disregarding the problematic stereotypical inference, once it has been made
explicit.
The stubborn inferences at issue are from words with distinct but related senses
(polysemes). Whereas words with different unrelated meanings (homonyms) activate
separately represented and mutually exclusive stereotypes that compete for sustained
activation (Beretta et al. 2005; Pylkkänen et al. 2006), polysemes typically activate
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a unified ‘core representation’ (Klepousniotou et al. 2012; MacGregor et al. 2015).
Often, this is the stereotype associated with the dominant sense (or a sense privileged,
e.g., through embodiment), which is then deployed to interpret utterances that use
the word in a less salient sense. According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, the
stereotype associated with the most ‘salient’, i.e., most frequently encountered and
prototypical,7 sense is activated most swiftly and strongly by the verbal stimulus,
irrespective of context (Fein et al. 2015; Giora 2003). According to the Reten-
tion/Suppression Hypothesis, readers/hearers often interpret utterances that employ
the word in a less frequent sense by retaining that initially most strongly activated
stereotype and suppressing its contextually irrelevant components (Giora 2003; Giora
et al. 2014). To interpret, for example, the metaphorical epistemic use of ‘see’ in ‘I see
your point’, hearers retain the situation schema associated with the dominant visual
use of the word, with agent-features including S looks at X, S knows X is there, and S
knows what X is, and patient features including X is in front of S and X is near S, and
then attempt to suppress all component features of the schema, except the epistemic
agent features.
But suppression of irrelevant components may remain partial: Frequently co-
instantiated core components of the stereotype laterally pass on activation among
each other (Hare et al. 2009; McRae et al. 2005). Where some, but not all of them
are contextually relevant, such lateral cross-activation of irrelevant components will
complement their initial strong activation due to salience and render their complete
suppression impossible.When they are only partially suppressed, schema components
continue to support stereotypical inferences. The psycholinguistic research reviewed
has motivated the Salience Bias Hypothesis (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019a, b): When
(i) one sense of a polysemous word is much more salient than all others, and
(ii) the dominant situation schema associated with that sense is retained to interpret
utterances employing a less salient use of that word, and
(iii) some, but not all, of the core schema components are contextually relevant,
then
(1) contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences licensed by the dominant
sense will be triggered by the less salient use as well, and
(2) these automatic inferences will influence further judgment and reasoning, even
when thinkers explicitly know they are inappropriate.
When stereotypical inferences that are initially triggered—as per (1)—clash with con-
textual information or background beliefs, they can be suppressed within one second
and before they influence further judgment and reasoning (Fischer and Engelhardt
2017b). (2) hypothesises that this does not happen, where conditions (i)–(iii) are met.
Where less salient uses are associated with distinct stereotypes, explicit marking of
the less salient use (through riders like ‘figuratively speaking’, ‘in a special sense’, etc.)
reinforces the activation of relevant stereotypes and helps themwin the competition for
activation against dominant stereotypes that initially receive stronger activation from
7 A sense of a polysemous word (e.g., ‘see’) is more or less prototypical depending upon whether it stands
for more or less prototypical examples of the relevant category (e.g., more or less prototypical cases of
seeing). This is typically assessed with a sentence completion task (Chang 1986).
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the verbal stimulus (Givoni et al. 2013). Sometimes, such reinforcement can thus
prevent inappropriate inferences. To prevent the inferences posited by the Salience
Bias Hypothesis, however, explicit marking would need to reinforce suppression of
components of the dominant schema, rather than activation of competitors. Therefore,
these inferences cannot be prevented by explicit marking of the less salient use.
The first experiments to examine the Salience Bias Hypothesis provided supporting
evidence from perception verbs, and illustrate the interplay between these conditions:
An eye-tracking study revealed extensive similarities in intricate processing patterns
for ‘aware’- and ‘see’-sentences that strongly suggest similar schemas are deployed
in interpreting them (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019b) with the Retention/Suppression
strategy [as per condition (ii)]. However, a corpus analysis on random 1000-sentence
samples from the British National Corpus confirmed that while the visual use is
clearly the most frequent for ‘S sees X’ (68% of sampled occurrences) [as per (i)],
it is far less frequent for ‘S is aware of X’ (23%) (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017a).8
Three studies that combined plausibility ratings with either pupillometry or reading
timemeasurements then provided evidence that competent speakersmake contextually
inappropriate inferences frompurely epistemic uses of ‘S seesX’ to spatial conclusions
(X is in front of S) unless the contextual relevance of typically co-occurring core schema
components isminimised [cf. (iii)], butmake such inappropriate inferences frompurely
epistemic uses of ‘S is aware of X’ [whose visual use is not dominant, cf . (i)] only
where the contextual relevance of such core schema components ismaximised (Fischer
and Engelhardt 2017b, 2019a, b). These inferences influenced further judgment, even
though participants drawn from the same population evinced explicit knowledge that
such inferences typically fail to lead from true premises to true conclusions (Fischer
and Engelhardt 2019a, pre-study).
The Salience Bias Hypothesis identifies a first set of conditions under which com-
petent speakers cannot help going along with stereotypical inferences they know to be
inappropriate. It thus provides first empirical foundations for the approach of critical
ordinary language philosophy that seeks to expose in philosophical arguments ‘seduc-
tive (mainly verbal) fallacies’ that can be operative as ‘concealed motives’ (Austin
1962, p. 5). To apply the approach to our target, the argument from illusion, and
vindicate the proposed diagnostic reconstruction (Sect. 1.1), we need to show that
these conditions apply to appearance verbs, and experimentally document inappro-
priate doxastic inferences from phenomenal uses of these verbs, such as those in the
argument’s initial premise.
2.3 Inferences from appearance verbs: hypothesis and previous experiment
In their philosophically relevant intransitive sense (‘Joe looks dirty’), appearance verbs
function as subject-raising verbs that are semantically unrelated to their grammatical
subjects (‘Joe’) and serve not somuch to predicate any property from their complement
(dirtiness) of those subjects’ referents (Joe) as to attribute to the often implicit patient an
8 Similarly, the visual use is clearly the most prototypical for ‘see’, but less pronounced for ‘is aware’, as
evidenced by 94% versus 46% pertinent completions in a sentence completion task (Fischer and Engelhardt
2017a).
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experiential, epistemic, or doxastic attitude towards a content (Joe is dirty) (Brogaard
2013, 2014). A distributional semantic analysis of the words’ intransitive use in a
parsed Wikipedia snapshot suggests that ‘seem’ and ‘appear’, and to a lesser extent
‘look’, are most frequently used to attribute doxastic attitudes, less frequently used to
attribute epistemic attitudes, and yet less frequently to attribute experiential attitudes
(Fischer et al. 2015). In their intransitive use, all three verbs share the same sense
(‘give a certain impression or have a certain outward aspect’, WordNet 3.1), which
is far more frequent than any other sense associated with an intransitive use (ibid.).
This suggests that, in conjunction with the relevant syntactic cues (Goldberg 2003),
all three verbs rapidly activate the same associated situation schema, or very similar
schemas. It further suggests that doxastic, epistemic, and experiential patient features
are integrated with decreasing strength into this ‘appearance schema’, or are integrated
in this order of strength, but with slightly different weightings, into similar schemas.
Fischer and colleagues (2019) hypothesise that this dominant schema is deployed
to interpret the phenomenal use of appearance-verbs, with the Retention/Suppression
strategy: This strategy retains the experiential component of the appearance schema
(S looks at X, X visually looks F to S), and attempts to suppress the remaining core
schema components (S thinks X is F, S knows X is F). The Salience Bias Hypothesis
then predicts that
H1 Phenomenal uses of appearance verbs (‘X seems F [to S]’, etc.) will [1] trigger
doxastic inferences (to S thinks that X is F) that [2] influence further judgment
and reasoning, even in contexts in which these inferences are explicitly cancelled.
To experimentally examine this hypothesis, Fischer et al. (2019) implemented the
cancellation paradigm (Sect. 2.1) with a forced-choice plausibility ranking task. In
their study, a questionnaire presents participants with short texts that differ in one
critical word, such as:
6a The hill seemed quite steep. The rambler thought it was gentle.
6b The hill was quite steep. The rambler thought it was gentle.
Participants then judge which of the two strike them as more plausible. Critical items
pair sentences using ‘look’, ‘appear’, or ‘seem’ with otherwise identical sentences that
employ the contrast verb ‘is’ which lacks doxastic implications. ‘Is’-texts are mildly
implausible, insofar as they claim that the viewer got quite obvious things wrong. If
appearance verbs are understood to take the subsequently mentioned protagonist as a
patient (The hill seemed steep to the rambler) and—as per H1—trigger doxastic infer-
ences (The rambler thought the hill was steep) that remain unsuppressed and influence
further cognition, the persistent clash with the sequel is felt to engender a contradic-
tion. Participants then judge mildly implausible ‘is’-texts (like 6b) more plausible than
outright contradictory appearance-sentences (like 6a). In this experiment, the conflict
with the sequel renders a phenomenal reinterpretation of the appearance verb contex-
tually appropriate. On such reinterpretation, the appearance sentence describes only
the protagonist’s (the rambler’s) experience but attributes no belief to him. This would
remove the impression of a contradiction. Consistent preferences of ‘is’-sentences
over alternatives therefore provide first evidence that doxastic inferences are made
from phenomenal uses of appearance verbs and are then maintained long enough to
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influence further judgment, even in contexts in which those inferences are explicitly
cancelled.
This study used the plausibility-ranking task to simultaneously test the further
hypothesis that these contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are not
defeated by competing pragmatic inferences. Participants who keenly feel the con-
flict between doxastic inferences and inconsistent sequels can avoid a contradictory
interpretation by reassigning the patient role of the appearance verb, from the text’s
protagonist (e.g., the rambler) to its author (the hill seems steep, not to the rambler, but
to the author of the questionnaire). This turns the first sentence into the expression of
an authorial self-attribution of a belief (I think the hill is steep). In contrast with belief
attributions to others, appearance sentences that imply such self-attributions are often
used to express hedged judgments about the agent-role filler, which the author could
have expressed more simply by writing, e.g., ‘The hill is steep’. From preference of an
appearance-verb over the simpler ‘is’ hearers-readers therefore infer with the Maxim
ofManner that doubt-and-denial conditions obtain (it is in doubt or contentionwhether
the hill is steep) (Grice 1961). These conditions make it more plausible that the pro-
tagonist (the rambler) should have a different belief. In this way, pragmatic inferences
that are higher in the pragmatic pecking order may defeat the stereotypical inferences
of interest (cf. Levinson 2000, pp. 157–158). By requiring comparisons of appearance
and ‘is’-sentences, the plausibility-ranking task invites competing Manner-inferences
that would attenuate preferences for ‘is’-sentences.
Fischer and colleagues assumed [a] that the patient-role reassignment that facili-
tates Manner inferences is more likely to occur the more contradictory an item seems
to participants. They further assumed [b] that items with abstract objects (‘The plan
looked good. Cole believed it was terrible’) would be perceived as more contradic-
tory than items with visual objects (like 6a). They therefore added an equal number
of critical items with abstract objects and predicted attenuated preferences for ‘is’-
sentences in these items. The attenuation of ‘is’-preferences concerning items with
abstract objects would show that the plausibility ranking task had managed to create
conditions inviting Manner inferences, so that consistent ‘is’-preferences concerning
items with visual objects would show that the doxastic inferences of philosophical
interest go through undefeated even under such conditions.
Fischer and colleagues examined preferences in English and in two languages
with increasingly rigid verb-final sentence structure, German and Japanese, where
inferences from the verb play a less central role in utterance interpretation and exert less
influence on further judgment and reasoning. Their findings were consistent with their
predictions: In items with visual objects (like 6), they observed consistent preferences
for ‘is’-sentences over counterparts with ‘look’, ‘appear’, and ‘seem’, and attenuated
preferences in items with abstract objects, across all three languages. They interpreted
these findings as evidence that the contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences
posited byH1 are not defeated in the perceptual cases of interest and took their findings
to support the initially a priori reconstruction of the ‘argument from illusion’ that takes
its opening move to rely on such inappropriate doxastic inferences from phenomenal
uses of appearance verbs (Sect. 1.1). But does this interpretation of the findings stand
up to scrutiny?
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3 Exploring an alternative explanation
3.1 An alternative explanation
Justin Sytsma (2019) proposed an alternative interpretation of these results. He ques-
tions the assumption that Fischer et al.’s participants base their judgments about items
with visual objects on interpretations that treat the protagonist of the second sentence
(e.g., the rambler) as the patient of the appearance verb in the first sentence (The
hill seemed quite steep to the rambler). Instead, participants could treat the author
as the patient. This could reflect participants’ initial assignment of the patient role or
its reassignment in line with Fischer et al.’s reasoning for items with abstract objects.
That is, this might happen because conflicts of initial doxastic inferences (The rambler
thought the hill was quite steep) with the sequel (‘The rambler thought it was gentle’)
lead participants to reassign the patient role from the protagonist to the author. Accept-
ing Fischer et al.’s reasoning, such reassignment would occur if, contra assumption
[b] above, participants perceive the items with visual objects as no less contradictory
than the items with abstract objects. Participants would thus come to interpret the
appearance sentence as expressing a belief or hedged judgment of the author of the
questionnaire (I think the hill is quite steep). If participants assign the patient role to
the author, either from the start or through reassignment, the observed preferences
for ‘is’-sentences over appearance sentences could not be due to a persistent clash of
doxastic inferences with the sequel—which attributes a belief to someone else (the
protagonist).
This reasoning motivates an alternative explanation of the observed preferences:
These are based on participants’ assessment of the first sentence only (e.g., ‘The hill
was quite steep’ vs. ‘The hill seemed quite steep’) and are driven by subjectivity
judgements. ‘Is’-sentences are read as stating an authorial claim about how things
are (The hill was quite steep). In line with treating the author as the patient of the
appearance verb, appearance sentences are read as expressing an authorial opinion
about how things are (I think the hill was quite steep). When forced to assess the
relative plausibility of the two, participants will therefore take into account whether
the author should be making a factual claim or express his opinion about the matter
at hand.9 In the absence of discourse context, this question will plausibly be decided
by objectivity/subjectivity judgments concerning the claim under discussion: Is this
more objective (more a matter of fact) or more subjective (more a matter of opinion)?
Whether visual objects have a certain shape, size, colour, or other visual property
presumably strikes participants asmore objective, leading them to prefer ‘is’-sentences
over appearance counterparts. Whether abstract objects have the properties the items
ascribe to them (e.g., whether a plan is good) will often strike participants as more
subjective, leading to attenuated preferences for ‘is’-sentences.
9 Implementations of the cancellation paradigm with plausibility assessment tasks assume that participants
interpret ‘plausible’ as ‘likely to be true’. This alternative account assumes participants will read it as
‘plausible or appropriate thing to say’. In line with common psycholinguistic practice, Fischer et al. (2019)
did not explain the intended meaning of ‘plausible’ to their participants, so cannot exclude this alternative
interpretation.
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On this account, the use of appearance verbs in Fischer et al.’s items are interpreted
throughout as doxastic, not phenomenal: The first sentences are interpreted throughout
as expressing an opinion of the author, and this doxastic attribution is not cancelled
by the sequel (which attributes an opinion to another person). Therefore, the observed
preferences provide no evidence that phenomenal uses of appearance verbs trigger
doxastic inferences that influence further judgment and reasoning, even in contexts
in which these inferences are explicitly cancelled. On this account of Fischer et al.’s
findings, they fail to provide support for hypothesis H1.
This criticism involves three hypotheses about how the items used by Fischer and
colleagues (2019) are processed and assessed. Initial motivation was provided by (h1):
(h1) Even if participants initially assign the patient role of the appearance verb to
the text’s protagonist, the appearance items with visual objects do not strike
participants as notably less contradictory than the appearance sentences with
abstract objects.
In response to such conflicts, participants would reassign the patient role. Either as a
result of such reassignment or from the start, the criticism holds:
(h2) Participants will tend to assign the patient-role of the appearance verb to the
text’s author (rather than its protagonist), across appearance items.
This would rule out Fischer et al.’s interpretation of their findings. Sytsma’s alternative
account of these findings then relies on a final hypothesis:
(h3) Claims about the visual objects will be deemed less subjective than claims about
the abstract objects.
We conducted three experiments to examine these hypotheses.
3.2 Experiment 1
To assess h1, the first study elicited contradictoriness ratings.
106 participants were recruited through advertising onGoogle for a free personality
test, which was administered after the main task. Participants were restricted to native
English-speakers, 16 years of age or older, who passed an attention check.10
Participants rated slight variations of the appearance sentences from the 36 critical
items used in Fischer et al. (2019). The first sentence of each text was modified to
make the patient explicit, e.g.,
The hill seemed quite steep to the rambler. The rambler thought it was gentle.
Participants were instructed that both sentences in each text are about the same per-
son and rated whether there is a contradiction between the two sentences on a scale
from 1 (‘no contradiction’) to 7 (‘complete contradiction’). As an attention check, an
additional item asked participants to select ‘5’ on the scale. Items were presented in
random order.
10 Ads were targeted to North America. Participants were 70.8% women (two non-binary), average age
46.3, ranging from 16 to 80.
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The mean contradictoriness rating for each item was numerically above the neutral
mid-point, with 33 of the 36 items being significantly above this point.11 Mean ratings
varied from a low of 4.03 (‘Their efforts seemed idealistic to Sam. Sam thought they
were self-serving.’) to a high of 5.93 (‘The estimate looked accurate to Anna. Anna
thought it was completely wrong.’) Further, for 35 of the 36 items, a majority of
participants gave a response above the neutral mid-point. Thus, in line with h1, we
find that participants generally treated the items as being contradictory.
Averaging across the visual items, we found a mean of 5.16, which was signifi-
cantly above the neutral mid-point t(105)  7.7198, p <0.0001. Averaging across the
abstract items, we found amean of 5.39, which was also significantly above the neutral
mid-point t(105)  10.023, p <0.0001.12 While the mean for the abstract items was
significantly greater than for the visual items, the effect size was negligible t(105) 
3.8956, p  0.00017, Cohen’s d  0.16. Breaking the results down by appearance
verb, we found this effect was driven by ‘looks’: For this verb, we found a significant
difference with a small effect size, with a mean of 5.00 for the visual items and 5.57
for the abstract items t(105)  5.6647, p <0.0001, Cohen’s d  0.36. By contrast, no
significant difference was found for either ‘appears’ (mean of 5.33 for visual items
vs. 5.32 for abstract items t(105)  0.13684, p  0.89) or ‘seems’ (mean of 5.14 for
visual items vs. 5.28 for abstract items t(105)  1.6181, p  0.11).
While we found that overall participants regarded abstract items as slightly more
contradictory thanvisual items, the effect sizewas negligible and therewas a significant
difference for only one of three appearance verbs. These results are consistent with
h1 and motivate the hypothesis that, even if participants in the study of Fischer and
colleagues (2019) initially assigned the patient role of the appearance verb to the
protagonist in the text, they reassigned it to the author, in appearance sentences with
both abstract and with visual objects. Experiment 2 tested more directly whether
participants assign the patient role to the author in both types of sentences.
3.3 Experiment 2
To assess h2, we elicited explicit patient role assignments to the appearance verbs in
the critical items at issue.
We recruited 44 participants with the same approach and from the same population
as in the previous experiment.13 Each participant received just the appearance verb
texts from Fischer et al.’s 36 critical items, along with the attention check used in
Experiment 1, in random order. For each item they had to indicate whether they
regarded the protagonist mentioned in the text or the text’s author as patient of the
appearance verb. For instance, for text 6a (above) participants were asked ‘Do you
11 P-values for the significant items ranged from 0.00090 to machine error (<2.2e−16). For the remaining
three items we found t(105)  1.5645, p  0.12 (‘The girl looked Korean to Jack. Jack believed she was
Japanese.’); t(105)  0.88119, p  0.38 (‘Michael’s socks looked dark blue to him. Michael thought they
were black.’); t(105)  0.1241, p  0.90 (‘Their efforts seemed idealistic to Sam. Sam thought they were
self-serving.’).
12 67.3% of participants gave a response above the neutral point across the visual items, 71.2% did so
across the abstract items.
13 Participants were 68.3% women, average age 42.3, ranging from 16 to 76.
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interpret the first sentence in this text in terms of the rambler finding that the hill
seemed quite steep or in terms of the author finding that the hill seemed quite steep?’
Participants answered by selecting either ‘The Rambler’ or ‘The Author’.
In linewith h2, for each of the 36 items, a largemajority of participants selected ‘The
Author’, with the proportion ranging froma lowof 75.0% to a high of 90.9%. Summing
across the visual items, we found that a significant majority selected ‘The Author’
(82.8%) χ2  340.1, p <0.0001. Results were almost identical for the abstract items
with a significant majority selecting ‘The Author’ (83.0%) χ2  342.73, p <2.2e−16.
Obviously, the proportions were not significantly different χ2  1.1923e−29, p  1.
3.4 Experiment 3
To assess h3, we elicited subjectivity ratings for the claims under discussion.
We recruited 43 participants with the same approach and from the same population
as in the previous experiments.14 Each participant received just the first sentence from
the ‘is’ texts for each of Fischer et al.’s 36 critical items, e.g.,
The hill was quite steep.
Items, along with the attention check used in Experiment 1, were presented in ran-
dom order. For each item participants rated whether it expressed an objective fact
or a subjective opinion on a scale from 1 (‘completely objective’) to 7 (‘completely
subjective’).
The mean subjectivity rating varied notably across the items, ranging from a low of
2.23 (‘the bird was a Hammerkop’) to a high of 5.53 (‘the young artist was talented’).
The ratings varied between the visual and the abstract items. The mean of individual
participants’ average ratings for the visual items was significantly lower (M  3.25,
SD  0.67) than for the abstract items (M  4.40, SD  0.67) t(42)  −8.5395, p
<0.0001. Further, the mean of the average ratings for the visual itemswas significantly
below the neutral point t(42)  −7.3164, p <0.0001, while the mean of the average
ratings for the abstract itemswas significantly above the neutral point t(42) 3.9255, p
 0.00032. In other words, participants tended to treat the visual sentences on average
as being distinctly objective, the abstract sentences on average as being distinctly
subjective, and the visual items as less subjective than the abstract items, as predicted
by h3.
3.5 Discussion
The results of Exp.1 suggest that, in the critical items from Fischer et al.’s (2019)
study, English-speakers generally find a patient-role assignment to the texts’ protago-
nist to be contradictory, for both items with visual objects and for items with abstract
objects. The significant but slight difference found in ratings for the two item types
(abstract>visual) is consistent with h1. Crucially, the fact that items of both types were
deemed distinctly contradictory continues to motivate the hypothesis h2 that partici-
pants will tend to assign the patient-role of appearance verbs in both types of items to
14 Participants were 65.1% women (two non-binary), average age 38.5, ranging from 16 to 74.
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the author. Exp.2 tested h2 more directly, using a transparent design that made the task
of patient-role assignment explicit and suggested an alternative assignment (namely,
to the author). Participants clearly preferred the alternative assignment. Nonetheless,
while the results are suggestive, they only provide limited warrant for the conclusion
that such assignment will also happen when task and alternatives remain implicit. The
results of Exp.3 supported h3, indicating that participants tended to see the texts with
visual objects as being less subjective than the texts with abstract objects. Together,
Exp. 1–3 provide initial support for the alternative explanation and motivate exami-
nation of the hypothesis that Fischer et al.’s (2019) study is subject to a confound.
In its strongest, but plausibly most intuitive form, the hypothesis posits two corre-
lations:
H2 Participants largely base their plausibility assessments for the critical items on
subjectivity-assessments for the claim under discussion: When the perceived
subjectivity of this claim increases, appearance-sentences strike participants
as increasingly appropriate, and the plausibility of appearance-texts (like 6a)
increases;when the perceived subjectivity of the claimunder discussion decreases
(i.e., its perceived objectivity increases), ‘is’-sentences strike participants as
increasingly appropriate, and the plausibility of ‘is’-texts (like 6b) increases.
As a result, participants in Fischer et al.’s study will tend to regard ‘is’-texts as more
plausible than otherwise identical appearance-texts when they feel the claims under
discussion are relatively objective, and less plausible than appearance-counterparts
when the claims under discussion feel relatively subjective. If so, this, rather than per-
sistent inappropriate inferences from the appearance verbs, might explain the observed
preferences.15
4 Main study
To more rigorously examine the key hypothesis H1 thrown into doubt by the studies
reported in the previous section, as well as to address H2, our main study implemented
the cancellation paradigm with a combination of eye tracking and plausibility ratings.
By combining these two measures, we can separately test hypotheses about what
automatic inferences are initially triggered (H1, part 1) andwhether they get suppressed
or influence further cognition (H1, part 2).
15 This alternative explanation makes two assumptions: First, participants prefer the text with the higher
individual plausibility rating. Second, if (as per H2) plausibility assessments for individual sentences/texts
are based on subjectivity ratings for the claim under discussion, preferences should be random, where
subjectivity ratings are neutral (and therefore do not favour either ‘is’ or ‘appear’). With H2, higher (above
neutral) subjectivity ratings could then explain preferences for appearance texts, and lower (below neutral)
ratings preferences for ‘is’ texts. While H2 posits two different correlations between subjectivity and
objectivity ratings (positive for appearance texts, negative for ‘is’ texts), each of these correlations could
explain preferences in the absence of the other. (By contrast, the alternative explanation cannot work, if both
correlations go the same way, or no correlations obtain.) While intuitively plausible, H2 thus is stronger
than strictly required.
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4.1 Predictions
In this study, participants read and rated items in which appearance sentences employ-
ing ‘look’, ‘appear’, or ‘seem’ were followed by a sequel that was either inconsistent
or consistent with the hypothesised stereotypical inference from the appearance verb
to a doxastic conclusion:
(1) The dress seemed blue. Hannah thought it was green. (stereotype-inconsistent)
(2) The dress seemed blue. Hannah thought it was navy. (s-consistent)
As in the study of Fischer and colleagues (2019), stereotype-inconsistent items with
‘look’, ‘appear’, and ‘seem’ were intended to invite phenomenal (re-)interpretation of
the verb. Participants also read and rated otherwise identical items with the contrast
verb ‘is’, which lacks stereotypical associationwith doxastic patient properties (where,
for convenience, we retain the label stereotype- or ‘s-in/consistent’ for counterparts
of stereotype-in/consistent appearance items):
(3) The dress was blue. Hannah thought it was green. (s-inconsistent)
(4) The dress was blue. Hannah thought it was navy. (s-consistent)
When we read sentences, our eyes may pass over the same words several times.16
Whereas first-pass reading times17 are largely determined by word length, word fre-
quency, and the word’s predictability in context (‘cloze probability’) (Rayner 1998),
difficulties in integrating information from different parts of the sentence may have us
reread bits of the sentence (Rayner et al. 2004; Clifton et al. 2007). Specifically, such
integration difficulties may have us reread the regions where the difficulty becomes
manifest (‘conflict region’) and regions perceived as the sourceof thedifficulty (‘source
region’). Where inferences triggered by previous words (‘seemed blue’) clash with
subsequent text (‘Hannah thought it was green’), this leads to higher rereading times
for either the conflict region (‘green’) or the source region (‘seemed blue’), or both.
This increases the total reading times for these regions (defined as the sum of all fixa-
tions in a region) and the second pass reading times (defined as total minus first pass
reading times). These two measures are known as ‘late’ reading times. The hypothesis
that appearance verbs trigger doxastic inferences (H1, part 1) predicts
[Prediction RT] Late reading times for conflict or source regions will be higher
in s-inconsistent appearance-items (like 1 above) than in ‘is’-
counterparts (like 3 above).
When initially triggered stereotypical inferences clash with contextual information
or with background beliefs, they can be suppressed within one second and before
they influence further cognition (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017b). The hypothesis that
the doxastic inferences of interest influence further cognition (H1, part 2) therefore
needs to be tested separately. It predicts that, in a subsequent non-speeded plausibility
16 For an accessible introduction to reading times and eye tracking, see Raney et al. (2014), for current
state of the art Clifton et al. (2016), for adaptation to study of reasoning Fischer and Engelhardt (2019b).
17 These are defined as the sum of all fixations in a region of text, from first entering that region until leaving
that region either in a forward or backward direction (Clifton et al. 2007). The terminology (‘second pass
reading times’, etc., see below) is not uniform in the literature.
123
Synthese
rating task, these inferences will reduce the plausibility of s-inconsistent appearance
sentences, where they clash with the sequel, but will not affect the plausibility of
s-consistent items. Hence:
[Prediction PL1] S-inconsistent appearance items (like 1 above) will be deemed less
plausible than s-consistent appearance items (like 2 above).
Since s-inconsistent ‘is’-items claim that protagonists are wrong about typically obvi-
ous matters (like the colour of a dress), we would expect participants to find them
mildly implausible. However, the doxastic inferences posited by H1 would render
s-inconsistent appearance items outright contradictory, and reduce their plausibility
even further. Hence:
[Prediction PL2] If s-consistent appearance and ‘is’ items (like 2 and 4) are deemed
equally plausible, s-inconsistent appearance items (like 1) will be
deemed less plausible than ‘is’-counterparts (like 3).
Such plausibility differences would provide evidence of cognitively influential
doxastic inferences from appearance verbs, in inappropriate contexts (namely, in s-
inconsistent items which invite phenomenal interpretation of the word).
The competing Hypothesis H2 suggests that plausibility judgments about s-
inconsistent texts (used in the previous plausibility ranking study and figuring
among the items in this new study) are driven by subjectivity ratings (rather than
by contextually cancelled doxastic inferences). To assess this hypothesis, we elicit
subjectivity-ratings for the claims under discussion in our items. These claims are
expressed by the first sentences of ‘is’ versions (e.g., ‘The dresswas blue’). H2 assumes
that readers of s-inconsistent appearance items will assign the verb’s patient role to the
author. This assignment—and only this assignment—turns the appearance-sentence
into the expression of an authorial opinion (I think the dress was blue) (Sect. 3.1). H2
suggests that participants then find appearance sentences, interpreted as expressions of
opinions, more appropriate, and appearance items more plausible, the more subjective
they deem the claim under discussion, and will find corresponding ‘is’ sentences more
appropriate, and ‘is’-items more plausible, the more objective (less subjective) they
deem the claims under discussion (Sect. 3.5). H2 thus predicts:
[Prediction PL3] For appearance items, there will be a positive correlation between
subjectivity ratings (for claims under discussion) and plausibility
ratings (for items); for corresponding ‘is’ items, there will be a
negative correlation between these ratings
In stereotype-inconsistent items, the patient-role assignment assumed by H2 can be
either due to reassignment in response to the perceived inconsistency or made from
the start (Sect. 3.1). If that assignment is made from the start, H2 should apply also
to stereotype-consistent items. Since we have not ruled out this possibility, we will
examine [PL3] first for all items and then for stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent
items, separately.
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Forty-eight first- and second-year undergraduate psychology students (9 males) from
the University of East Anglia participated for course credit. All were native speakers
of English with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
4.2.2 Materials
Each participant read 48 critical items (six for each of eight conditions) and 48 fillers.
All items were about visual objects. Half of the critical items involved basic visual
properties (colour, shape, size, 8 items each). The other half involved less basic, but
easily visually ascertainable properties like material (silver, wood), or age (young,
old). S-inconsistent items used antonyms in first and second sentence. S-consistent
items used synonyms, or the second sentence used a sub-ordinate category (blue—
navy). Appendix 1 gives a list of critical items. As verbs were rotated across items,
mean length and frequency of words in the source regions were the same across verb
conditions (except for the unavoidable differences between ‘is’, ‘look’, ‘appear’, and
‘seem’). Following the normingwork (described below)we ensured that, in the conflict
regions, neither the mean frequencies (consistent: 126, inconsistent: 182 occurrences
in reference corpus Leech et al. 2001) nor the mean lengths (consistent: 5.54 charac-
ters, inconsistent: 5.25) of the adjectives differed significantly between the s-consistent
and the s-inconsistent items (length: t(46) −0.58, p 0.57, frequency: t(46) 0.80,
p  0.43).
To guard against floor effects and ensure intelligibility of items, a norming study
with twenty-six participants from the same population rated the plausibility of ‘is’-
versions of candidate items (half s-consistent, half s-inconsistent), on a 5-point scale.
Participants identified words they did not understand and did not rate the items con-
taining them. We excluded all items where the s-inconsistent version attracted a mean
rating <2.5, and excluded or rephrased all items where at least two participants failed
to understand a constituent word.
4.2.3 Apparatus
Eye movements were recorded with an SR Research Ltd. EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker
which records the position of the reader’s eye every millisecond. Head movements
were minimised with a chin rest. Eye movements were recorded from the right eye.
The sentences were presented in 12 pt. Arial black font on a white background.
4.2.4 Design and procedure
We manipulated the verb in the first sentence (‘is’, ‘look’, ‘appear’, ‘seem’) and the
consistency of the sequel with hypothesised doxastic inferences (s-consistent vs. s-
inconsistent), in a 4×2 design. All variables were manipulated within subject. We
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measured first pass, second pass, and total reading times for source regions, conflict
regions, and their constituent words.
After a 9-point calibration and validation procedure, participants completed two
practice trials and 96 experimental trials. These included 48 critical trials. Each partici-
pant saw an equal number of items in each condition, as verbswere rotated across items
using a Latin Square Design. Before each trial, participants fixated a drift-correction
dot on the left edge of the monitor, centred vertically. The sentence appeared after
an interval of 500 ms. The initial letter of each sentence was displayed in the same
position as the drift correction dot. The entire sentence appeared on a single line on
the screen. The participant read the sentence silently and then pressed the spacebar on
the keyboard. A plausibility-rating prompt appeared, and participants rated sentences’
plausibility on a scale from 1 to 5, by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard.
Endpoints were explained as ‘very implausible’ (1) and ‘very plausible’ (5), and the
midpoint (3) as ‘neither plausible nor implausible; the decision feels arbitrary’.
4.3 Results
To preview findings, results largely bore out predictions derived from H1, but not
predictions from H2.
We analysed plausibility ratings for all itemswith a 2×4 (context×verb) repeated-
measures ANOVA. This revealed large main effects of consistency F(1,46)  387.21,
p <0.001, η2  0.89 and verb F(1,46)  7.53, p <0.01, η2  0.14, and a marginal
2-way interaction F(1,46)  3.29, p  0.076, η2  0.07 (see Fig. 1). Participants
rated s-consistent items distinctly plausible, or significantly above neutral mid-point,
in all verb conditions (p’s<0.001 for all mean ratings), and deemed s-consistent items
with different verbs equally plausible F(3,138)  0.59, p  0.62, η2  0.01. By
contrast, s-inconsistent items with all verbs were deemed distinctly implausible, or
significantly below mid-point (all p’s<0.001), and there were significant differences
between verb conditions F(3,138)  3.54, p <0.05, η2  0.07. As per prediction
[PL1], s-inconsistent items with an appearance verb were deemed less plausible than
s-consistent counterparts (‘look’: t(46)  15.07, p <0.001; ‘appear’: t(46)  15.87,
p <0.001; ‘seem’: t(46)  16.11, p <0.001). Prediction [PL2] predicted that if s-
consistent items with appearance verbs and ‘is’ are deemed equally plausible, the
consistency manipulation will render appearance items less plausible than ‘is’ items.
Participants indeed rated s-consistent items with all verbs equally plausible (above).
As predicted by [PL2], s-inconsistent items with ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ were deemed
less plausible than s-inconsistent items with the contrast verb ‘is’ (appear vs. is: t(46)
 −2.09, p  0.04; seem vs. is: t(46)  2.65, p  0.01). The mean plausibility rating
for s-inconsistent items with ‘look’ (2.40) was numerically lower than the mean rating
for similar ‘is’-items (2.43), but, against predictions, this difference was not significant
t(46)  0.36, p  0.72. Further comparisons between s-inconsistent items revealed
that the difference between ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ was not significant t(46)  0.74, p 
0.46, the difference between ‘look’ versus ‘seem’ was significant t(46)  2.48, p 
0.02, and that between ‘look’ versus ‘appear’ trended towards significance t(46)  −
1.41, p  0.09.
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Fig. 1 Mean plausibility ratings. Error bars show the standard error of the mean
Our prediction [RT] about reading times only concerns later reading times for s-
inconsistent items. The observed plausibility ratings suggest that later reading times
will vary between verbs only for such items. Our analysis of reading times therefore
focused on s-inconsistent items. We predicted that late (total and second pass) reading
times for conflict or source regions will be higher for s-inconsistent items with verbs
‘look’, ‘appear’, and ‘seem’ than for corresponding itemswith ‘is’. However, most rel-
evant trials involved a striking pattern of eye movements: When reading s-inconsistent
items, participants regressed from the end of the final sentence to the source region
(e.g., to ‘seemed blue’ in ‘The dress seemed blue. Hannah thought it was green’),
reread the source region, and then progressed to the plausibility-rating screen without
rereading the conflict region (e.g., ‘green’). To take these findings into account, we
report total reading times for the conflict region. Since second pass ( total minus first
pass) reading times are the most precise measure of integration difficulties, we report
these for the crucial source region.
We analysed reading times for s-inconsistent items with a one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA with verb type having four levels (manipulated within item). This
revealed that total reading times for the conflict region (e.g., ‘green’) were not signif-
icantly different for items with different verbs F(3,138)  1.39, p  0.25, η2  0.03
(see Fig. 2). By contrast, second pass reading times for the source region, obtained
by summing across the first verb and first object (e.g., ‘seemed blue’), showed a large
effect of verb F(3,138)  4.65, p <0.01, η2  0.24. Paired comparisons revealed
second-pass reading times were appreciably higher in ‘appear’-items than ‘is’-items
t(46)  3.41, p  0.001 and in ‘seem’-items than in ‘is’-items t(46)  −2.85, p 
0.007, consistent with prediction [RT]. By contrast, the difference between ‘look’-
items and ‘is’-items was not significant t(46) −1.34, p 0.19. Differences between
items with different appearance verbs also remained shy of significance: Differences
were marginally significant between ‘look’- and ‘appear’-items t(46)  1.92, p 
0.06, but not between ‘look’- and ‘seem’-items t(46)  −1.55, p  0.13. For further
reading times, with discussion, see Appendix 2.
As we will presently discuss, these findings provide evidence that the intended
phenomenal uses of ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ in our items triggered doxastic inferences
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Fig. 2 Left panel shows total reading time on the conflict region. Right panel shows the summed second-pass
reading time on verb and adjective jointly making up the source region. Error bars show the standard error
of the mean
that influence further cognition, and support hypothesis H1 for ‘appear’ and ‘seem’,
but not for ‘look’.
4.4 Follow-up study
To assess whether plausibility ratings were largely based on subjectivity judgments,
in the way suggested by H2, we recruited 107 participants with the same approach and
from the same population as in Experiments 1–3.18
Participants rated the claims under discussion for all critical items used in the
main study, as expressed by the first sentence of items’ ‘is’ versions (e.g., ‘The dress
was blue’). Participants rated them on a scale from 1 (‘completely objective’) to
7 (‘completely subjective’). We then calculated the mean subjectivity ratings and
reanalysed the data from the main study to assess H2’s prediction [PL3] that mean
plausibility ratings for items would correlate with mean subjectivity ratings for claims
under discussion, positively for items with appearance verbs and negatively for items
with ‘is’. Accordingly, the following analyses were conducted on items, rather than
participants.
Mean subjectivity ratings for claims under discussion varied between 1.52 (‘The
word’s spelling was correct’) and 5.31 (‘The building was quite grand’), and neatly
divided into halves close to mid-point (4), with half the claims receiving mean rat-
ings of 4.2 or above. A two-way ANCOVA, which included context (consistent and
inconsistent) and verb type (with four levels) and subjectivity ratings as a covariate,
showed significant main effects of context F(1,22)  16.87, p <0.001, η2  0.43 and
subjectivity F(1,22)  5.78, p  0.025, η2  0.21 as well as a significant interaction
between context and subjectivity F(1,22)  5.13, p  0.03, η2  0.19. Crucially,
however, results revealed no significant effect of verb F(1,22)  1.29, p  0.27, η2
 0.001 and no interaction between verb and subjectivity F(1,22)  0.15, p  0.74,
η2  0.001, and there were also no significant correlations between subjectivity and
plausibility ratings (all p’s>0.42). This is inconsistent with prediction [PL3] derived
from hypothesis H2.
18 Participants were 83.2% women (one non-binary), average age 40.2, ranging from 16 to 77.
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However, H2 was initially advanced as a hypothesis about s-inconsistent items
(Sect. 3.4), and was then tentatively extended to s-consistent items (Sect. 4.1). Next,
we therefore considered stereotype-consistent and—inconsistent items separately. The
s-consistent items showed no significantmain effects or interaction (all p’s>0.30). The
correlations between subjectivity and plausibility ratings were not significant, either
(is: r  0.07, p  0.75; look: r  0.16, p  0.45, appear: r  0.05, p  0.83; seem:
r  −0.08, p  0.70). That is: Differences in subjectivity did not correspond to any
changes in plausibility. Themore subjective half of the s-consistent itemswere deemed
roughly as plausible as the more objective half of the s-inconsistent items, across all
verb conditions (subjective half mean plausibility  4.51 and objective half mean
plausibility  4.41).
The crucial s-inconsistent items showed no main effect of verb F(1,22)  2.78, p
 0.11, η2  0.11, but a significant and large main effect of subjectivity F(1,22) 
14.40, p 0.001, η2  0.40. Crucially, however, there was no interaction between verb
and subjectivity F(1,22)  1.10, p  0.31, η2  0.048. Against prediction [PL3], we
found negative correlations between subjectivity and plausibility ratings not only for
items with ‘is’ (r  −0.50, p  0.014) but also for items with ‘look’ (r  −0.56, p 
0.005), ‘appear’ (r  −0.47, p  0.019), and ‘seem’ (r  −0.44, p  0.030). That is:
The more subjective the relevant claims were deemed, the less plausible s-inconsistent
items were judged, regardless of the verb used (i.e., there was no effect of verb). The
more subjective half of the s-inconsistent items were deemed less plausible than the
more objective half of the s-inconsistent items, across all verb conditions (subjective
half mean plausibility  2.07 and objective half mean plausibility  2.53). Strikingly,
plausibility ratings were numerically higher for ‘is’ items (2.17) than for appearance
items (2.04), for the more subjective half of our s-inconsistent items (where H2 sug-
gested that appearance verbs would be deemedmore appropriate and appearance items
more plausible than items with the supposedly more objective ‘is’).
4.5 Discussion
The follow-up study’s findings speak against H2, and against subjectivity being a
confound for the main study. According to H2, participants base plausibility ratings
for items on how appropriate the first sentence’s verb (‘is’ vs. ‘appear’, etc.) is in
view of the subjectivity of the claim under discussion. Differences in plausibility are
then attributed to differences in subjectivity, which are held to affect the plausibil-
ity of ‘is’ and appearance sentences in different ways. However, when considering
the whole sample, we found no significant correlations between subjectivity ratings
(for claims under discussion) and plausibility ratings (for items), for any verb con-
dition—despite a main effect of subjectivity. Moreover, this effect disappeared when
we considered only s-consistent items (which employ the same first sentences as
s-inconsistent items). This suggests that participants’ plausibility ratings were not
influenced mainly by the first sentence and the fit between its verb and the subjectivity
of the claim under discussion. Subjectivity ratings did affect the plausibility of items in
the s-inconsistent condition. However, it affected the plausibility of all s-inconsistent
items in the same way, namely decreased it across all verb conditions—rather than
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increasing the plausibility of appearance items and decreasing that of ‘is’ items (as per
H2). Differences in subjectivity therefore cannot explain the differences in plausibility
between s-inconsistent items with different verbs.
The follow-up findings help us interpret the main study’s findings concerning H1.
They help address the question of how participants interpret the crucial s-inconsistent
items in the main study (‘The dress seemed blue. Hannah thought it was green’):
whether they assign the patient role of the appearance verb to the protagonist (Hannah)
or to the author, either from the start or as a result of reassigning the patient role from
protagonist to author in response to the otherwise severe clashwith the sequel (see Sect.
3.1). Assignment of the patient role to the author would turn the appearance sentence
into the expression of an authorial opinion or hedged judgment about a matter of fact.
This would lead participants to interpret s-inconsistent items as expressing a clash of
subjective opinions between the author and the protagonist. The claim that there is
such a clash should seem more plausible when the matter at hand is deemed more
subjective. In line with [PL3], patient-role assignment to the author thus predicts a
positive correlation between subjectivity and plausibility ratings for appearance-items.
However, we observe a negative correlation for the crucial s-inconsistent items. We
infer that, as long as no alternative assignment is explicitly suggested to them (as in
Exp.2), participants assign the patient-role of the appearance verb to the protagonist
in the text (The dress seemed blue to Hannah).
As long as this assignment is maintained, the most obvious interpretation of s-
inconsistent items that avoids a contradiction is the phenomenal interpretation intended
by the experimenters. On this reading, the items’ first sentence attributes merely an
experiential attitude to the protagonist (The dress visually appeared blue, to Hannah),
but no doxastic attitude (Hannah may well still believe that it has another colour than
it looks to her, here and now, under these lighting conditions, etc.). This avoids con-
tradiction with the sequel but makes for a mildly implausible scenario. Since the items
do not make any deviations from stereotypical viewing situations explicit, participants
will infer with the I-heuristic (Levinson 2000; see Sec. 2.1 above) the absence of fac-
tors (like odd lighting) that could lead a protagonist to distrust appearances, and will
think it mildly implausible that the protagonist should think the object has one visual
property (as asserted by the sequel), when it looks another to them. To win through to
this non-contradictory, phenomenal, interpretation of these implausible items, readers
need to completely suppress the doxastic component features of the situation schemas
associated with appearance verbs.
Higher second-pass reading times for source regions in s-inconsistent appearance
sentences (‘seemed green’) than in corresponding ‘is’ sentences (‘was green’) could
be due either to such suppression effort or to cognitive effort expended on patient
reassignment (from protagonist to author, see above). Having excluded patient reas-
signment, we interpret observed elevated second-pass reading times for source regions
in sentences with ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ as evidence of the effort to suppress contextually
inappropriate schema components that is involved in phenomenal interpretation of the
appearance verb.19 Lower plausibility ratings for s-inconsistent items with ‘seem’ and
19 Discussion of the technical psycholinguistic issue of why clashes in s-inconsistent items led to rereading
primarily of source regions but not of conflict regions is beyond the remit of this paper.
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‘appear’ than ‘is’ suggest that this effort meets with only partial success, and the dox-
astic conclusions inferred continue to influence ratings. We thus take these findings
to support hypothesis H1 for two of the three appearance verbs examined: At any rate
phenomenal uses of ‘seem’ and ‘appear’ trigger doxastic inferences which are at most
partially suppressed and continue to influence further judgment.
In contrast with ‘appear’ and ‘seem’, ‘look’-items pattern with ‘is’-items, in the
s-inconsistent condition: Neither the second-pass reading times for the source regions
nor the plausibility ratings are significantly different, and both are deemed distinctly
implausible (if more plausible than ‘appear’ and ‘seem’). This suggests that par-
ticipants construct for both ‘look’ and ‘is’-sentences situation models where the
protagonist looks at the object; they then find it roughly equally implausible that
the protagonist should judge the object viewed to have one property, when it actually
possesses (‘is’) or looks another, in stereotypical viewing conditions (see above). Near-
est neighbour analyses of ‘look at’ (Fischer et al. 2019; Fn.22) and ‘look F’ (Fischer
et al. 2015, Appendix) suggest these verbs are associated with epistemic and doxastic
features, respectively, but more weakly than ‘seem’ and ‘appear’ are. In both cases,
these stereotypical features need to be suppressed, to arrive at a consistent—e.g., phe-
nomenal—interpretation of s-inconsistent items. Given the weaker association of the
relevant features, suppression requires less effort than with ‘seem’ and ‘appear’, as
evidenced by lower second-pass reading times for the source region, and this lesser
suppression effort meets with greater suppression success, as evidenced by higher (if
still low) plausibility ratings in the main study. The fact that, in Exp.1, ‘look’ was the
only appearance verb which led to lower contradictoriness ratings for s-inconsistent
items with visual objects than abstract objects provides further evidence that partic-
ipants find it easier for ‘look’ than ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ to win through to a largely
phenomenal interpretation which attributes experiential features (available for items
with visual objects, but not with abstract objects) but is largely devoid of doxastic
implications.
Yet further evidence is provided by a follow-up study we undertook in response to
a reviewer query (and report in Appendix 3). Participants judged the acceptability of
items that make, respectively, doxastic and non-doxastic uses of appearance verbs to
describe familiar cases of non-veridical perception (where nobody is taken in). For all
three appearance verbs, they deemed non-doxastic uses acceptable (e.g., ‘Seen from
the beach, the huge ships anchored out at sea look small’, though nobody believes
they are small). This suggests that all three verbs are used—also—in a non-doxastic
‘phenomenal’ sense, in ordinary discourse. But non-doxastic uses were deemed more
acceptable for ‘look’ than the other verbs. This suggests that for ‘look’ this non-
doxastic phenomenal sense is more salient, and the doxastic sense less salient, than
for the other verbs, so that contextually inappropriate doxastic inferences are easier
to suppress, and exert less influence on further cognition (as per the Salience Bias
Hypothesis).
To sum up, present findings largely confirm H1 and suggest that phenomenal uses
of ‘seem’ and ‘appear’ trigger contextually inappropriate doxastic inferences that
influence further cognition, whereas any doxastic inferences readers may make from
‘look’ can be swiftly suppressed. Themain study also helps us assess the hypothesisH2
that explains observed plausibility judgments with reference to subjectivity judgments
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rather than to inappropriate doxastic inferences. Present findings speak against this
potential confound affecting the present main study. It also excludes this confound for
a previous plausibility ranking experiment (Fischer et al. 2019) (see Appendix 4).
However, present findings partially diverge from findings of this and another pre-
vious study employing the forced-choice plausibility-ranking task: Fischer et al.
(2019) observed significant preferences of ‘is’-sentences over appearance sentences,
in s-inconsistent items with all three appearance verbs. In the present study, mean
plausibility ratings were numerically minimally lower for s-inconsistent ‘look’- than
for ‘is’-sentences. The forced-choice plausibility-ranking paradigmmay translate such
insignificant plausibility differences into significant differences in preference. How-
ever, an earlier study (Fischer and Engelhardt 2016) using the same paradigm found
random preferences for ‘look’- over ‘appear’-sentences, whose mean plausibility rat-
ings in the present study display a larger numerical difference than ‘look’ and ‘is’.
The experimental findings specifically for ‘look’ thus present a mixed picture.
5 Main findings and philosophical application
This paper’s main study provided evidence that competent language users make con-
textually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from phenomenal uses of appearance
verbs ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ to attributions of doxastic attitudes, which influence further
judgment even when explicitly cancelled by the context. In conjunction with prior
distributional semantic analysis (Sect. 2.3), these findings suggest that, in their intran-
sitive use, ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ are primarily and irrepressibly doxastic terms; they are
primarily used to attribute doxastic attitudes to patients and cannot completely shed
their doxastic implications. By contrast, ‘look’ is used less often for this purpose and
can be more easily interpreted as simply commenting on the looks of a thing, rather
than the doxastic attitudes of its beholder (cf. Austin 1962, pp. 36–37).
5.1 Re-assessing the target argument
These findings help us assess the influential ‘argument from illusion’, whose initial
premise typically uses ‘appear’ or ‘seem’ (rather than ‘look’) to describe cases of non-
veridical perception (Sect. 1.1). Present findings allow us to support the key elements
of our initial a priori reconstruction of the argument (Sect. 1.1) with an experimentally
supported empirical explanation (cf. Sect. 1.2).
The explanation is this: In line with the Salience Bias Hypothesis (Sect. 2.2), inap-
propriate doxastic inferences lead from the phenomenal use of appearance verbs in
the initial premise (1) ‘When viewed sideways, the round coin appears elliptical’ to
the implicit conclusion (C) ‘The viewer thinks that the object viewed is elliptical.’
Integration of (C) with the contextual information that the coin is round leads to the
conclusion (C*) ‘The viewer has a wrong belief about the coin, and does not know
that it is round, or that there is a round coin.’ These conclusions feed into the situ-
ation model. The categorization question, whether viewer and object fall under the
category x is aware of y, is then assessed on the basis of conformity with the ‘aware-
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ness’ stereotype, with a version of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and
Frederick 2002). The most highly weighted component features of the ‘awareness’
stereotype are epistemic (Fischer et al. 2019), so (C*) suggests conformity is low,
and the representativeness heuristic delivers the judgment (2) that (more likely than
not) the viewer is not aware of the round coin. Together, the Salience Bias Hypothesis
and a well-researched judgment heuristic can thus explain the move from the initial
premise to the first explicit conclusion of the argument from illusion. In the face of
plausible principles of charity (Thagard and Nisbett 1983) (Sect. 1.2), this empirically
supported explanation justifies the diagnostic hypothesis that this influential argument
is vitiated by a contextually inappropriate stereotypical inference from ‘appears’ or
‘seems’ that prevents the argument from getting off the ground (Sect. 1.1).20,21
So far, we have considered only the early twentieth century version of the argument
from illusion, addressed by Austin (1962). Prima facie, the contemporary version
(rendered canonical by Robinson 1994, and Smith 2002) seems to dispense with
the move we explained. It invokes instead the Phenomenal Principle (ii below) and
Leibniz’ Law (iv below):
(i) When subjects view a round coin sideways, the coin appears elliptical to them.
(ii) Whenever something appears a sensible property F to observers, they are
(directly) aware of something that actually has this property. Hence:
(iii) When subjects view a round coin sideways, they are (directly) aware of some-
thing that actually is elliptical (an elliptical speck).
(iv) If b has a property a lacks, a b.
(v) When subjects view a coin sideways, they are (directly) aware of something
other than the round coin (an elliptical speck or ‘sense-datum’).
The Phenomenal Principle, however, ‘is nowhere near the truth. No onewould agree
that if someone looks old then there must be something old’ (Snowdon 2015, p. 128).
Fischer et al. (2019) suggest that the principle only seems compelling to proponents
20 In the rare cases where ‘look’ is used in the initial premise, any inappropriate doxastic inferences
triggered by the verb will not influence the further argument. In these cases, we submit, the argument is
accepted due to belief bias (Thompson and Evans 2012) and prior belief in the conclusion, accepted due to
standard versions of the argument or parallel arguments (e.g., arguments from hallucination).
21 In line with the ‘reflection defence’ against challenges from evidential experimental philosophy (see
Machery 2017, for a review), a reviewer questioned whether this explanation applies to philosophers who
spent more time and attention considering the argument from illusion than our lay participants spent on
processing our experimental items. Empirical studies have investigated how (a) response time, (b) envi-
ronmental factors conducive to slow and careful reflection (increased response delay, financial incentives,
demand for justification, and analytic priming), and (c) a disposition to engage in reflection influence ver-
dicts about verbally described cases in philosophical thought experiments (Colaço et al. 2018; Weinberg
et al. 2012). All these factors facilitate correction of less reflective judgments, where these are [i] explicit
and [ii] can be corrected by using normative rules like those of arithmetic, logic, or probability theory. How-
ever, none of the factors investigated were found to influence case verdicts about verbally described cases
in philosophical thought experiments. This matters here: The initial premise of arguments from illusion is
a brief verbal case description. The argument’s base step articulates a philosophical thought experiment.
The crucial conclusions (C) and (C*) remain implicit and it is at best unclear whether normative (rather
than heuristic) rules are available for their correction. Increased time and attention are therefore unlikely
to prevent (C) and (C*) from influencing further judgment, and thus unlikely to change spontaneous case
verdicts (like 2). Our account is thus likely to apply to philosophers too. We suspect that in case-based rea-
soning reflection is directed less at modifying than at justifying unreflective case verdicts (cf. Schwitzgebel
and Ellis 2017).
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of the argument because they misinterpret supposedly noncommittal talk of ‘elliptical
specks’, etc.: In well-establishedmetaphorical usage, these phrases are ordinarily used
to pick out physical objects by the way they look to the speaker, there and then, when
one cannot tell what they are (‘What is that small red speck in the valley? Could that be
a fire truck?’) or wishes to avoid stereotypical implications of knowledge (‘She saw the
grey specks grow larger. Had she recognised them as enemy planes, she would have
run for cover’). Proponents of the argument misinterpret these phrases as attributing
properties to something because they already presuppose the conclusion (2 above)
that the viewer is not aware of the physical objects she looks at. This now implicit
conclusion renders the above metaphorical interpretation impossible, and leads to
default literal interpretation, which in turn requires positing an alternative object of
awareness as literal bearer of the property in question.22 Also in its current version, the
argument therefore relies on the spontaneous inference from the initial case description
(1) to the negative conclusion (2) explicitly acknowledged by the earlier version of
the argument—and is, on the account we propose, reliant upon the inappropriate
stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs we documented and explained as a
result of salience bias.
This paper’s experimental demonstration of these inferences thus completes the first
successful experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy in
the wake of Austin (1962): the exposure of a contextually inappropriate stereotypical
inference at the root of an influential philosophical argument, namely, the argument
from illusion that was already Austin’s main target.
5.2 Directions for future research
The argument from illusion is arguably not the only influential philosophical argument
reliant on inappropriate stereotypical inferences that result from salience bias. Philoso-
phers often takewords that already have a dominant sense in ordinary discourse and use
them in a related but rare—or even entirely new—sense, to meet specific philosophi-
cal research needs or to talk about unusual cases. Wherever this happens, reliance on
a common polysemy processing strategy (Retention/Suppression strategy, Sect. 2.2)
will lead to salience bias and inappropriate inferences that may vitiate philosophical
argument—confirming Austin’s (1962, p. 63) hunch that ‘tampering with words … is
always liable to have unforeseen repercussions.’
Thus, it has been suggested that arguments from hallucination (e.g., Ayer 1956;
Smith 2002) rely on factive inferences that are licensed by the dominant perceptual
sense of perception verbs, but not the phenomenal sense intended in the arguments
(Fischer and Engelhardt 2019a) and that Chalmers’ (1996) zombie argument relies
on inferences from his technical use of ‘zombie’ that are licensed only by the noun’s
dominant (‘Hollywood’) sense and are defeated by contextual information essential to
22 The plausibility of this literal interpretation may turn on implicit adherence to the Cartesian Theatre
conception of the mind as a complementary space of perception, which can house these alternative objects
of awareness (Fischer et al. 2015, p. 286). This implicit theory may thus support accommodation of the
inappropriate stereotypical inference that renders plausible ‘phenomenal’ judgments like (iii) above. The
Phenomenal Principle is then formulated to rationalize these judgments.
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the argument (Fischer andSytsma2020).23 At the same time, evidence that the ordinary
use of causal attributions is morally laden (e.g., Livengood et al. 2017; Livengood
and Sytsma 2020), whereas metaphysical argument often intends a purely descriptive
use, motivates the question whether common philosophical thought experiments that
use morally valenced cases (assassinations, etc.) can support metaphysical arguments
about ‘causation’ in the intended descriptive sense.
As developed by Austin (1962), critical ordinary language philosophy seeks to
expose ‘seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies’ that may act as ‘concealed motives’ for
adopting persuasive but unwarranted philosophical conclusions that clash with back-
ground knowledge—and thus generate bogus problems. Following Austin’s lead, this
paper examined contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from words that
thinkers cannot help going alongwith, evenwhen they explicitly reject them.However,
not only automatic comprehension inferences we renounce, but also implicit theories
we explicitly reject, may lead to clashes between conclusions of implicit cognition
and explicit knowledge. Thus, implicit extramissionist theories of vision—according
to which something ‘leaves the eye’ when we see—have been experimentally found
to influence judgments about perceptual objects, even when thinkers explicitly reject
those theories (Guterstam et al. 2019; cf. Shtulman and Valcarcel 2012). The two fac-
tors may work together in philosophical argument. For example, an implicit theory of
the mind as an inner space of perception may facilitate accommodation of inappro-
priate stereotypical inferences, in the argument from illusion (Fn.22). This suggests
exciting new perspectives for an experimental implementation of ordinary language
philosophy’s critical project that seeks to ‘dissolve’ philosophical problems by expos-
ing, more generally, divergences between implicit cognition and explicit knowledge,
arising from a variety of sources involving different kinds of conceptual structures
(stereotypes and implicit theories).
With relevance beyond ordinary language philosophy, this paper explored meth-
ods that allow experimental philosophers to extend their investigation from intuitive
judgments to automatic inferences. Experimental philosophers tend to content them-
selves with the use of single output measures. Psycholinguists tend to study automatic
comprehension inferences with process measures. The present paper demonstrated
that, as it stands, neither approach is fully satisfactory for the new purpose of study-
ing natural language reasoning, and to exclude potential confounds: To examine with
the psycholinguistic cancellation paradigm whether initially triggered comprehension
inferences go on to influence further judgment and reasoning, we found it helpful to
complement a process measure with plausibility ratings; to exclude a potential con-
found, we examined their correlation with another output measure. This model may
be helpful for further study of how automatic comprehension inferences shape auto-
matic inferences in natural language reasoning—including philosophical arguments
and thought experiments.
23 Using a different theoretical framework, Nichols and Pinillos (2018) propose that sceptical arguments
are facilitated by inferences supported by an infallibilist concept of knowledge, that children acquire this
concept through exposure to child-directed speech in which uses of ‘know’ consistent with infallibilism are
dominant, and that this concept will influence reasoning even where ‘know’ is used in a fallibilist sense.
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Appendix 1: List of critical items
Verbs (“is”, “look”; “appear”, “seem”) were rotated across lists in a Latin Square
Design. Asterisks indicate regions of interest.
1 *The dress*was*blue.*Hannah*thought it was*green.*
2 *The dress*was*blue.*Anna*thought it was*navy.*
3 *The cake’s icing*seemed*rose-coloured.*Tim*believed it was*white.*
4 *The cake’s icing*seemed*rose-coloured.*Tom*believed it was*pink.*
5 *The socks*looked*dark blue.*Michael*thought they were*black.*
6 *The socks*looked*dark blue.*Andrew*thought they were*indigo.*
7 *The colours*appeared*bright.*Greg*believed they were*dull.*
8 *The colours*appeared*bright.*Chris*believed they were*lively.*
9 *The hill*was*steep.*Peter*thought it was*gentle.*
10 *The hill*was*steep.*Paul*thought it was*sheer.*
11 *The courtyard*seemed*rectangular.*Phil*believed it was*square.*
12 *The courtyard*seemed*rectangular.*Bill*believed it was*oblong.*
13 *The medal*looked*elliptical.*Joe believed it was*round.*
14 *The medal*looked*elliptical.*Jim*believed it was*oval.*
15 *The chef*appeared*heavy.*Sam*believed he was*slim.*
16 *The chef*appeared*heavy.*Sue*believed he was*fat.*
17 *The cat darting across the street*was*small.*Ben*believed it was*large.*
18 *The cat darting across the street*was*small.*Matt*believed it was*little.*
19 *The building*seemed*quite grand.*Alex*thought it was*humble.*
20 *The building*seemed*quite grand.*Will*thought it was*stately.*
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21 *The dog partially hidden by the fence*looked*massive.*Daniel thought it
was*small.*
22 *The dog partially hidden by the fence*looked*massive.*William*thought it
was*large.*
23 *The bathroom*appeared*reasonably large.*Julian*believed it was*small.*
24 *The bathroom*appeared*reasonably large.*Gabriel*believed he was*big.*
25 *The shop*was*shut.*Sophie*believed it was*open.*
26 *The shop*was*shut.*Ellie*believed it was*closed.*
27 *The fruit*seemed*overripe.*John*believed it was*fresh.*
28 *The fruit*seemed*overripe.*Ron*believed it was*rotting.*
29 *The jacket*looked*much used.*Edward*thought it was*new.*
30 *The jacket*looked*much used.*Gareth*thought it was*old.*
31 *The deer lying at the roadside*appeared*conscious.*Amy*believed it
was*dead.*
32 *The deer lying at the roadside*appeared*conscious.*Kim*believed it
was*alive.*
33 *The dog in the yard*was*gentle.*Grace*thought it was*dangerous.*
34 *The dog in the yard*was*gentle.*Sarah*thought it was*harmless.*
35 *The office*seemed*disorderly.*Dan*thought it was*tidy.*
36 *The office*seemed*disorderly.*Dick*thought it was*messy.*
37 *The word’s spelling*looked*correct.*Olivia*believed it was*wrong.*
38 *The word’s spelling*looked*correct.*Emily*believed it was*right.*
39 *The man*appeared*advanced in years.*Mary*thought he was*young.*
40 *The man*appeared*advanced in years.*Emma*thought he was*old.*
41 *The group’s actions*were*organised.*James*thought they were*haphazard.*
42 *The group’s actions*were*organised.*Joshua*thought they were*coordinated.*
43 *The statue*seemed*bronze.*Michael*thought it was*gold.*
44 *The statue*seemed*bronze.*Andrew*thought it was*brass.*
45 *The cutlery*looked*silver.*Jack*believed it was*steel.*
46 *The cutlery*looked*silver.*Joe*believed it was*sterling.*
47 *The flooring*appeared*wooden.*Sarah*thought it was*laminate.*
48 *The flooring*appeared*wooden.*Eve*thought it was*mahogany.*
Despite our norming efforts, two s-consistent items (numbers 10 and 14) and two
s-inconsistent items (numbers 5 and 45) attracted mean plausibility ratings that were
outliers (SD’s>3) and were excluded from further analyses (i.e. plausibility and eye
movements).
123
Synthese
Fig. 3 Mean first pass reading times for the verb region in inconsistent items. Error bars show the standard
error of the mean
Appendix 2: Further reading times
First pass reading times
Verb region
Results showed a significant effect of verb F(3,138)  19.18, p <0.001, η2  0.29
(see Fig. 3). Paired comparisons revealed reading times were appreciably lower in ‘is’-
items than appearance verb items (appear-is: t(46)  5.88, p <0.001, look-is: t(46)
 −5.69, p <0.001, seem-is: t(46)  −6.35, p <0.001). In contrast, the appearance
items were not significantly different from one another (all p’s>0.18). The difference
between ‘is’-items and appearance items is easily explained by the shorter length and
greater frequency of ‘is’ (Rayner 1998).
First object
Results showed no main effect of verb F(3,138)  0.92, p  0.43, η2  0.02 (see
Fig. 4). This means first pass reading times for the first object (e.g., ‘blue’ in item
1) were not significantly different for items with the contrast verb ‘is’ than for the
appearance verbs.
Conflict region
Again, there was no main effect of verb F(3,138)  0.75, p  0.52, η2  0.02 (see
Fig. 5). This means first pass reading times for the conflict region (e.g., ‘green’ in
item 1) were not significantly different for items with the contrast verb ‘is’ than for
the appearance verbs.
Total reading time: source region
Total reading times on the source region (e.g., ‘was blue’, in item 1) showed a sig-
nificant main effect of verb F(3,138)  9.22, p <0.001, η2  0.17 (see Fig. 6).
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Fig. 4 Mean first pass reading times for the first object in inconsistent items. Error bars show the standard
error of the mean
Fig. 5 Mean first pass reading times for the conflict region in inconsistent items. Error bars show the standard
error of the mean
Fig. 6 Mean total reading times for the source region in inconsistent items. Error bars show the SE of the
mean
The significant differences were between ‘is’ and the appearance verbs (appear-is:
t(46)  5.02, p <0.001, look-is: t(46)  −2.57, p <0.05, seem-is: t(46)  −4.48, p
<0.001). The comparison between ‘look’ and ‘appear’ was also significant t(46) 
2.11, p <0.05, the differences between ‘appear’-‘seem’ and ‘look’-‘seem’ were not
p’s>0.08. Observed differences were driven not by first-pass reading times (above)
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Fig. 7 Mean re-reading times for the conflict region in inconsistent items. Error bars show the SE of the
mean
but by second-pass reading times that are indicative of integration difficulties (Sect.
4.3).
Second pass reading time: conflict region
Results showed no significant main effect of verb F(3,138)  1.28, p  0.28, η2
 0.03 (see Fig. 7). This is in line with first-pass reading times and the fact that
while approximately 90% of trials showed a regression from the conflict region, only
22.2% of trials involved a return to the conflict region. This suggests that integration
difficulties were addressed in re-reading the source region.
Appendix 3: Follow-up study on ‘phenomenal’ sense
We conducted an acceptability rating study to examine two hypotheses:
hI In ordinary discourse, all three appearance verbs have a ‘phenomenal’ sense or
use that carries no doxastic implications (and allows us to say, e.g., that the round
coin appears elliptical, when viewed sideways).
hII This sense or use is more salient for ‘look’ than for ‘appear’ and ‘seem’.
Examination of hI is motivated by a reviewer query whether all three verbs have a
phenomenal sense in ordinary discourse (or only in philosophy). Examination of hII
is motivated by the mixed experimental picture concerning inappropriate doxastic
inferences from ‘look’ (Sect. 4.5).
Methods
We recruited 51 participants with the same approach and from the same population as
in Experiments 1–3 (Sect. 3). They were all native English-speakers (74.5% women,
three non-binary, with an average age of 36.5, ranging from 16 to 77). Participants
received instructions that explained with the help of an example that the same word
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may be used in different senses, so that sentences that may appear to contradict each
other can all be true, when using the word in different senses. They were told ‘we
are interested in whether the verbs “look”, “appear”, and “seem” are used in different
senses that allow people to say different things that may appear to contradict each
other’. They were instructed to ‘take into account all senses of these verbs that you
are familiar with’, and asked to rate on a 7-point scale their confidence that given
sentences using these verbs can be accepted as saying something true. Endpoints were
explained as follows: ‘“1” means you are entirely confident that the sentence cannot
be accepted as saying something true. “7” means you are entirely confident that the
sentence can be accepted as saying something true. The mid-value “4” means you are
really unsure whether or not the sentence can be accepted as saying something true.’
Participants rated 18 sentences that described familiar cases of non-veridical per-
ception, where no adult perceiver is inclined to form a wrong belief about the shape,
size, or colour of the object seen. Sentences used appearance-verbs either in a non-
doxastic sense (to describe the looks of the object) or a doxastic sense (to state what
property the viewer will think the object has), for example:
When you look at a round coin sideways, the coin looks elliptical. (non-doxastic,
ND)
When you look at a round coin sideways, the coin looks round. (doxastic, D)
Thefirst sentence is acceptable as trueonly if the verbhas anon-doxastic reading (under
the circumstances, nobody believes the coin is elliptical); the second is acceptable only
if the verb has a purely doxastic reading (the viewer will believe the coin is round,
but that is no description of what the coin ‘phenomenally’ looks like). Three pairs of
sentences used shape adjectives, three used size, three used colour. Further examples
include:
Seen from the beach, the huge ships anchored out at sea appear small/huge. (ND)/(D)
Under red light, white lab coats seem reddish/white. (ND)/(D)
Sentences were presented in random order. Verbs were rotated across items. Hypothe-
ses concern non-doxastic (ND) items only. Doxastic items were intended as fillers,
to ensure through contrast that participants would take into account the difference in
adjectives (e.g., ‘white’–‘reddish’) in the critical ND items.We thusmanipulated a sin-
gle variable (verb) with three levels. One participant was excluded as outlier (>3SDs
from the mean in all conditions), prior to analysis.
Our analyses were driven by our a priori hypotheses. hI predicts that participants
will accept ND items with all three verbs as saying something true (namely, in the non-
doxastic sense), i.e., that acceptability ratings for ND items with all three verbs will
be above neutral mid-point ‘4’. We assessed hI through three one-sample t-tests with
a test value of 4. hII predicts higher ratings for ND items with ‘look’ than ‘appear’ or
‘seem’. This results in a directional one-tailed hypothesis assessed via paired-samples
t-tests.
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Results and discussion
For ND items, mean ratings (with SDs) for ‘look’ (5.37, 1.09), ‘appear’ (5.03, 1.05),
and ‘seem’ (4.97, 1.10) sentences were all significantly above mid-point 4 (appear:
t(49)  6.92, p <0.001; look: t(49)  8.88, p <0.001; seem: t(49)  6.23, p <0.001).
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that non-doxastic ‘look’ sentences attracted ratings
significantly different from counterparts with ‘appear’ t(49)  −1.70, p  0.048 and
‘seem’ t(49) 1.71, p 0.047. In contrast, ratings for ND sentences with ‘appear’ and
‘seem’ were not significantly different t(49)  0.31, p  0.38. For thoroughness, we
also analysed results for doxastic items.Here,mean ratings (with SDs) for ‘look’ (3.12,
1.23), ‘appear’ (3.25, 1.25), and ‘seem’ (3.07, 1.09) sentences all were significantly
below 4 (appear: t(49)  −4.25, p <0.001; look: t(49)  −5.05, p <0.001; seem:
t(49) −6.00, p <0.001). Results for the paired-samples t-tests showed no significant
differences between the conditions (all p’s>0.39).
Ratings for ND items were consistent with our hypotheses. However, since the
doxastic sense or use of appearance verbs is well attested, in particular for ‘appear’
and ‘seem’ (Sect. 2.3), the ratings below neutral mid-point observed for doxastic (D)
items with all three verbs suggest that participants answered a different question: How
confident are you that the sentence is an acceptable (plausible or natural) thing to say
about the situation envisaged? On this reading, the observed low ratings for D items
are consistent with the dominance of the doxastic sense at any rate for ‘appear’ and
‘seem’: Participants did not find it plausible or natural to use this—familiar—sense
to talk about familiar situations of non-veridical perception. This may be because the
circumstances indicated do not change judgment (adult perceivers are too conversant
with them), but do change the way things look, so that participants inferred that the
sentence must be about the way things look. On this reading, high ratings for ND items
suggest participants found it plausible or natural to invoke a non-doxastic phenomenal
sense to talk about the way things look. But this implies they recognised, and were
familiarwith, such a sense.Also on this reading, observedND ratings therefore support
hI. That participants find it more natural to use this non-doxastic sense of ‘look’ than
‘appear’ or ‘seem’ suggests the sense is more prototypical for ‘look’ (see Fn7). This
is consistent with higher salience, as per hII.
Appearance verbs arguably are the linguistic devices best suited to talk about the
way things look in cases of non-veridical perception. The fact that, even so, the propor-
tionof ‘6/7’-ratings remainedoverall low forND items (53%) suggests that participants
frequently found it impossible to completely suppress doxastic inferences from these
verbs, even with strong contextual support (stronger than in the main study). The fact
that the proportion of such ratings was lower for ND items with ‘appear’ (47%) and
‘seem’ (51%) than ‘look’ (56%) suggests that participants found it easier to com-
pletely suppress doxastic inferences from ‘look’. This is predicted by the Salience
Bias Hypothesis in conjunction with hII and the corollary that the doxastic sense is
less dominant for ‘look’ than the other verbs. We conclude that all three appearance
verbs have a non-doxastic ‘phenomenal’ sense in ordinary discourse, and this sense is
more salient for ‘look’ than ‘appear’ and ‘seem’.
123
Synthese
Appendix 4: Discussion of H2
Themain study of the paper (reported in Sect. 4) also helps us assess the hypothesis H2
as an alternative explanation of findings from a previous plausibility ranking experi-
ment (Fischer et al. 2019). Instead of invoking inappropriate doxastic inferences, this
explanation (Sect. 3.5) suggests that preferences for ‘is’ sentences in items like
The hill seemed/was quite steep. The rambler thought it was gentle
are based on how subjective versus objective the question under discussion (whether
the hill is steep) is deemed to be: Participants prefer ‘is’ where this question is deemed
objective, and appearance sentences where this is more subjective; the second sen-
tences of items (‘The rambler thought it was gentle’) are not taken into account.
In the present main study, participants rated both items consistent and inconsistent
with the doxastic inferences posited by H1. This consistency manipulation in the
second sentence affected plausibility ratings very strongly and more strongly than
any other factor examined. This suggests that plausibility assessments also in the
prior plausibility ranking study were influenced by the second sentences that affected
consistency. Furthermore, in the present study, the consistency manipulation affected
the plausibility of sentences with different verbs (slightly) differently, as we observed a
(marginal) verb×consistency interaction.This suggests thatwhere verbs have stronger
stereotypical associationswith doxastic patient properties, doxastic inferences reduced
the plausibility of s-inconsistent sequels more strongly. We therefore infer that, in
the earlier study, preferences were influenced by differences in verbs’ strength of
stereotypical association with doxastic inferences that were cancelled by the second
sentence.
Crucially, the follow-up study (Sect. 4.4) showed that higher subjectivity ratings
either failed to change plausibility ratings (in the s-consistent condition) or changed
the plausibility of both appearance and ‘is’-sentences in the same direction, and to
pretty much the same extent (in the s-inconsistent condition). Differences in subjec-
tivity ratings therefore cannot explain the observed differences in plausibility ratings
between items with ‘is’ and with appearance verbs ‘appear’ and ‘seem’, in the main
study, or the preferences observed in the earlier plausibility ranking study by Fischer
et al. (2019) (with only s-inconsistent items).
Finally, H2’s alternative account requires that the patient role of verbs in appear-
ance sentences be assigned to the author, rather than the protagonist, of the text (Sect.
3.1). This predicts a positive correlation between subjectivity and plausibility ratings
for appearance sentences (Sect. 4.1). The findings of the follow-up study excludes
this confound at any rate for items with visual objects. (The present study examined
no others.) These findings speak against H2 and suggest that, in the earlier study by
Fischer et al. (2019), at any rate the preferences for ‘is’-sentences over appearance sen-
tences in itemswith visual objects were based onmaking andmaintaining contextually
inappropriate doxastic inferences about the protagonist.
Fischer and colleagues (2019) further observed attenuated preferences in items
with abstract objects. They adduced this to a moderate amount of patient reassign-
ment in such items, due to higher levels of perceived contradictoriness (Sect. 2.3).
This explanation is inconsistent with the fact that, in our new Exp.1, s-inconsistent
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appearance items with visual and with abstract objects were deemed equally contra-
dictory, at any rate in items with verbs ‘seem’ and ‘appear’ (Sect. 3.2). The negative
correlation between subjectivity and plausibility ratings observed in the follow-up
study for s-inconsistent items with visual objects (Sect. 4.4) provide an alternative
explanation for patient reassignment in items with abstract objects: Without patient
reassignment, participants infer that protagonists have beliefs or opinions that clash
with those attributed to them by the sequel; protagonists entertain clashing doxastic
attitudes. The negative correlation means that participants find it less plausible that
a protagonist has clashing doxastic attitudes towards matters of subjective opinion
than towards matters of objective fact. This might reflect epistemic doubt: Participants
take s-inconsistent items to convey that protagonists are second-guessing themselves.
Second-guessing oneself may intuitively make more sense when the matter at hand is
objective rather than subjective.
In Exp.3, most items with abstract objects were perceived as more subjective than
most items with visual objects: Breaking down the 36 items by quartiles based on
descending subjectivity rating, we observe: Of the nine most subjective items, all but
one item had an abstract object (88.9%). Of the second nine items, all but two had
an abstract object (77.7%). By contrast, of the least subjective nine items, all but one
had visual objects and of the second to bottom nine all but two had visual objects.
This means that 15 of 18 items with an abstract object (83.3%) were in the more
subjective half of items, while 15 of 18 items with visual objects (83.3%) were in the
less subjective half.
Even though appearance items with visual and abstract objects are perceived as
equally contradictory, items with abstract objects tend to be perceived as more sub-
jective, so that second-guessing oneself intuitively makes less sense and items are
perceived as less plausible. Principles of charity have readers take remedial action to
avoid gross implausibility. This extra source of implausibilitymay therefore push some
appearance items with abstract objects over the threshold at which some participants
resort to patient reassignment to obtain a more plausible interpretation of appearance
sentences. This could account for the attenuation in preferences for ‘is’-sentences
observed by Fischer and colleagues (2019). We therefore take present findings to
reinstate the findings from that previous study in the light of a potential confound.
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